

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NATO 02931

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, NATO
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF 1977 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REF: USNATO 2565 (DTG 301700Z APR 77)

1. THERE FOLLOWS IN PARA 4 THE REVISED DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF 1977 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE (J DE G (77)49), WHICH, IF APPROVED, WILL BE ATTACHED AS AN ANNEX TO THE DPC MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE (SEPTTEL). DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) WILL ADDRESS THIS DRAFT ON MAY 12.
2. THE REVISED DRAFT IS A CONDENSATION OF AND IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PRECEDING VERSION (REF A). IN RESPONSE TO MAY 6 DRC DISCUSSION (SEPTTEL), IT TONES DOWN THE PESSIMISM OF THE EARLIER DRAFT AND PRESENTS A MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF THE STATE OF ALLIANCE DEFENSES. SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL POLISHING, WE PROPOSE, THEREFORE, TO SUPPORT THE TEXT IN ITS PRESENT FORM AND ITS UNCLASSIFIED
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RELEASE.

3. ACTION REQUESTED; WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE IN THIS APPROACH.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF J DE G (77)49:
MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE -- 1977

DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY

NATO OBJECTIVES

1. THE OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO IS TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA PRIMARILY BY A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE EFFECTED BY CONFRONTING ANY POSSIBLE THREATENED OR ACTUAL AGGRESSION WITH ADEQUATE NATO FORCES, WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENSE AND FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

2. THE WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE INCREASINGLY OFFENSIVE IN POSTURE AND NOW CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL INTERESTS ON A GLOBAL SCALE. SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES CONTINUE TO IMPROVE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF NEW NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS, INCLUDING THE EXPECTED DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 MOBILE INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND BEYOND. IT IS IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD, HOWEVER, WHERE THE GROWTH OF THE WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY HAS BEEN MOST PRONOUNCED. IN PARTICULAR, THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO STAGE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE WITHOUT REINFORCEMENT. THE IMPROVED OFFENSIVE AND DEEP PENETRATION CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT TACTICAL AIR FORCES NOW PERMIT THE WARSAW PACT TO CONDUCT THE INITIAL STAGES OF AN AIR ATTACK TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN HITHERTO WITH IN-PLACE FORCES. THE SOVIET UNION CAN NOW EXERCISE SEA POWER ON A GLOBAL
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SCALE.

3. THE STEADY GROWTH IN MILITARY POWER IS BACKED IN THE SOVIET UNION BY AN ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 11 PERCENT AND 13 PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCE (NEARLY THREE TIMES THE NATO AVERAGE) AND BY AN ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURE OF ABOUT 5 PERCENT. THE HEAVY INVESTMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION IN MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT HAS BEGUN TO ERODE THE QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGE IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT LONG ENJOYED BY NATO.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

4. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES ARE UNDERTAKING SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, MANY DEFICIENCIES REMAIN IN NATO FORCES AND THE DISPARITY IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT CONTINUES TO WIDEN. THIS ADVERSE TREND POINTS TO CERTAIN AREAS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN BOTH NATIONAL AND NATO PLANNING.

NATO STRATEGY, WARNING OF WAR AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

5. NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR DETERRENCE AND FORWARD DEFENSE REMAINS VALID. HOWEVER, IF NATO IS TO RETAIN THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THIS STRATEGY AND TO AVOID THE NEED TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT AN EARLY STAGE OF A CONFLICT, A BALANCED FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH EMPHASIS PLACED ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. WHILE NATO SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE WARSAW PACT AGGRESSIONS,

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PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO NATO'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN ATTACK BY READY FORCES AFTER VERY LITTLE WARNING. FOR DETERRENCE AS WELL AS DEFENSE NATO GOVERNMENTS NEED TO BE ABLE TO TAKE PROMPT POLITICAL DECISIONS IN TIMES OF TENSION, SO THAT NATO CAN DEPLOY ITS FORCES IN A TIMELY AND ORDERLY FASHION READY FOR WAR.

NATO FORCES

6. THE ENHANCED ABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AT SHORT NOTICE PLACES ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON NATO'S NEED FOR ADEQUATE, FULLY TRAINED AND EXERCISED IN-PLACE FORCES. RESERVE FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF BEING

DEPLOYED RAPIDLY AS ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED UNITS. SYSTEMS FOR RAPID CALL-UP SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND EXERCISED. REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION FORCES SHOULD REACH AN AREA OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT BEFORE AN AGGRESSION TAKES PLACE OR, IF WARNING TIME IS VERY SHORT, EARLY ENOUGH TO AFFECT THE INITIAL COURSE OF

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HOSTILITIES. SPECIAL EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON PRE-STOCKING, ON THE TIMELY PROVISION OF SEA AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND ON ADEQUATE RECEPTION FACILITIES. FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO IN MANY INSTANCES DO NOT MEET THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS AND THIS SHOULD BE CORRECTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DEFENSE AGAINST ARMOR

7. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIANCE HAS IMPROVED ITS ANTI-ARMOR CAPABILITIES, A GAP PERSISTS BETWEEN THESE CAPABILITIES AND THE THREAT POSED BY THE WARSAW PACT'S ARMORED FORCES AND MORE ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS SHOULD BE ACQUIRED.

MARITIME

8. IF THE ALLIANCE IS TO MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO COPE WITH THE EMERGING THREAT AT SEA, AND TO PROTECT THE SEALANES FOR THE TIMELY REINFORCEMENT AND RESUPPLY OF EUROPE, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE RATE OF IMPROVEMENT OF NATO'S MARITIME FORCES BE INCREASED.

AIR DEFENSE

9. THE INCREASING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO IMPROVE NATO'S AIR DEFENSES OVER LAND AND AT SEA. TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF NATO FORCES, THE ALLIANCE'S INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED AND MODERNIZED.

REGIONAL ASPECTS

10. THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA IS INDIVISIBLE. ON THE FLANKS AN ADEQUATE ALLOCATION OF FORCES AND A BALANCED MILITARY EFFORT MUST BE ASSURED; CONTINUED EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO STRENGTHEN LOCAL MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES, ADVANCE THE ARRIVAL TIMES OF EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS AND IMPROVE RECEPTION AND OTHER LOGISTIC

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ARRANGEMENTS. FOR SOME COUNTRIES ASSISTANCE FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES IS REQUIRED AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR IMPROVED REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES.

NEW TECHNOLOGY

11. WHILE IT WOULD BE ILLUSORY TO BELIEVE THAT MODERN TECHNOLOGY CAN OFFER CHEAP SOLUTIONS, IT CAN PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH, IF UTILIZED IN A TIMELY AND INTEGRATED MANNER, CAN BESTOW SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS ON THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF NATO.

ALLIANCE COOPERATION

12. NATO RESOURCES ARE NOT BEING EMPLOYED TO THE BEST EFFECT SINCE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ARE ORGANIZED FOR THE MOST PART ON A NATIONAL BASIS, AND THE PREROGATIVES OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF FINANCE ARE BOUND TO PLACE LIMITS ON THE PACE AND DEGREE TO WHICH INTEGRATION CAN BE ACHIEVED. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT THERE IS STILL MUCH ROOM FOR A BETTER ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE RESOURCES, ESPECIALLY THROUGH GREATER ALLIANCE COOPERATION. THIS PROCESS WOULD BE GREATLY FACILITATED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING INCORPORATING A LONGER-TERM APPROACH. ONLY THUS WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A TIMELY AND ORDERLY WAY THE NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS, SET THE PRIORITIES, RECONCILE DEMANDS ON RESOURCES FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH THOSE REQUIRED FOR NATIONAL EFFORTS, AND IDENTIFY AREAS FOR COOPERATION.

ARMAMENTS PLANNING

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13. THE TREND FOR THE COST OF EQUIPMENT TO INCREASE DIS-
PROPORTIONATELY IN RELATION TO MOST OTHER DEFENSE COSTS
HAS CONTINUED. IN MANY CASES THE COST OF MAJOR DEFENSE
PROJECTS IS BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF MOST MEMBER NATIONS
TO FINANCE ALONE. THE COST OF EQUIPMENT IS ALSO
OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE FOR POTENTIAL BUYERS AMONG ALLIES
BECAUSE OF THE BUDGETARY IMPACT ON THEIR DEFENSE PLANNING.
INTERESTED COUNTRIES SHOULD THEREFORE BE INVOLVED IN
RELEVANT PROJECTS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. SEPARATE RE-
SEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENT WEAPON
SYSTEMS FOR SIMILAR ROLES HAS LED TO PROBLEMS OF NON-
STANDARDIZATION AND THE LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN
FORCES AND EQUIPMENT OF MEMBER NATIONS.

14. ON-GOING STUDIES SHOULD THEREFORE BE PURSUED WITH A
VIEW TO HARMONIZING NATIONAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT PLANNING
PROCEDURES AND DEVELOPING NATO LONG-TERM ARMAMENTS
PLANNING. THE AIM OF THESE EFFORTS SHOULD BE STANDARDIZA-
TION AND, WHERE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, FULL INTEROPERA-
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BILITY. IN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES, AN INCREASE IN
TRAFFIC IN THE "TWO-WAY STREET" BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA IN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT WILL BE
NECESSARY.

IMPACT ON NATO PLANNING

15. IN DEVELOPING MORE RATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR NATO'S
LONG-TERM PLANNING FOR DEFENSE THE ALLIANCE MUST SEEK TO
HARMONIZE PLANNING MECHANISMS FOR THE VARIOUS COOPERATIVE
AND SUPPORTING PROGRAMS, AND TO DOVETAIL THE RESULTS OF
THIS EFFORT WITH THE PRESENT NATO FORCE PLANNING
PROCEDURES INTO A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FOR ALLIANCE
DEFENSE PLANNING; THE NEED FOR EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF
THE RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF MAJOR COOPERATIVE PROJECTS
WILL BE OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. THE ACTIVITIES OF RE-
GIONAL GROUPS, SUCH AS THE EUROGROUP, WILL HAVE AN IM-
PORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE IN THIS CONTEXT.
CONCLUSION

16. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES FOR ALLIANCE CO-
OPERATION DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION IS ESSENTIAL IF THE
FULL POTENTIAL OF AVAILABLE DEFENSE RESOURCES IS TO BE
REALIZED.

RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE.

17. (BEGIN BRACKETS) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ADVERSE TRENDS IN THE NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE AND IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONTINUED DETERIORATION IN THE RELATIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES, AN ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENSE BUDGETS SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES. NATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE INFLATIONARY IMPACT OF RISING PAY AND PRICE LEVELS TO ENSURE THAT PLANNED REAL INCREASES ARE ACHIEVED. NATIONS SHOULD, MOREOVER, ENDEAVOR TO INCREASE THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, IN PARTICULAR THE PERCENTAGE OF SUCH EXPENDITURE DEVOTED TO MAJOR EQUIPMENT, BUT WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO COMBAT READINESS. (END BRACKETS)
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PRIORITIES

18. PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THOSE CAPABILITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO DETERRENCE AND TO NATO'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND THE INITIAL PHASES OF ATTACK AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO MEASURES WHICH WILL ENHANCE READINESS, EFFECTIVENESS, SURVIVABILITY, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL; ENABLE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AND PROMOTE THE COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO EQUIPPING, SUPPORTING AND TRAINING ALLIANCE FORCES. END TEXT. STREATOR

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